Defense Acquisition: Ready for Reform?
According to the United States Constitution, one of the key purposes of the national government is to provide for the defense of its citizens.
1 Domestic political and economic pressures have a direct effect on defense choices, but globalization has added international concerns to the decision-making process. 2 For the United States, it is a particularly complex and expensive mission to protect national interests. With changing threats and shrinking budgets, how do senior leaders decide among the military ways and means to achieve defense ends?
To support the United States' security strategy, leaders throughout the whole of government must consult a series of publications for guidance which stakeholders translate into required capabilities. Senior military leaders compare defense capabilities to requirements to determine gaps and associated risks, as well as how to mitigate them. In doing so, leaders must also consider international political expectations, changing external threats, ongoing economic stress, and waning domestic support for military intervention overseas. 3 To effectively resource existing or new capabilities under these constraints, senior leaders will need to balance strategic, political, and budgetary pressures to secure viable, timely, best-value solutions. Failure to do so will imperil our defense.
The executive branch publishes the National Security Strategy, which provides an azimuth for the whole of government by describing major national security concerns, how the President of the United States intends to address them, and overarching ends as they relate to enduring national interests. 4 Based on the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes the National Military Strategy of the United States. It prioritizes the ways to 2 achieve our national ends using defense means, provides objectives and operational concepts, and serves as the foundation of subordinate strategies. 5 In January 2012, the President of the United States directed the Department of Defense to issue additional guidance to refine the 2010 National Security Strategy. 6 The resulting documents, Together, these strategic documents guide the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process, the Joint Capabilities Integration
Development System (JCIDS), and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). These three elements work together as decision support mechanisms to support the National Military Strategy. 7 They encompass the Department of Defense's current procedure to define and adjudicate deliberate requirements and associated acquisition criteria for future defense programs. 8 This capability-based approach relies on Combatant
Commander-and Service Chief-identified capability gaps. Those gaps are based on their respective analyses of the national strategy, specified priorities, and known economic constraints, as compared to existing capabilities. 9 The key question, then, is whether this capability-based approach is effective in obtaining the best value for the nation's dollar with respect to capabilities and resources. This paper will analyze the current methodology used to determine military requirements and resource them, then offer potential ways to improve these processes.
Past and Present
Under the old threat-based planning approach, the military services were the primary drivers of the acquisition system. Each service used its own strategic vision and requirements as the basis for developing and fielding strategic solutions. This bottom-up method proved expensive because integration of various solutions occurred late in the process, if at all, resulting in competing, duplicate, and parochial capabilities. 10 In contrast, the capability-based planning approach originates from a centralized national strategy. The National Security Strategy serves as the foundation for a series of subordinate defense and military strategies, coordinated among the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders. During capabilities-based assessment, strategic guidance determines "needs", a comparison of those needs with current capabilities identifies "gaps" and associated "problems and risks", and results in possible "solutions" which leaders must gauge against national interests and priorities.
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The intent of the current process is to generate jointly-coordinated support to national strategic needs, with overall costs and benefits weighed throughout the process so that capability gaps through analysis of the national strategy, specified priorities, and known economic constraints. Although they subscribe to the principle of serving the greater good, it is common for them to disagree about the ways and means to achieve defense ends. Jointly, they must prioritize the most critical gaps to fill, then seek to fund and build the required material solutions. Senior leaders receive information for consideration through the combined efforts of the PPBE Process, the JCIDS and the DAS. Although not directly linked, these three sub-elements (Figure 1 ), are aligned and meant to work together as decision support mechanisms for the Secretary of Defense.
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Their interaction is critical to the efficiency and effectiveness of the capability-based approach. The Deputy Secretary of Defense oversees the PPBE process, designed to ensure efficient resource allocation aligned with the National Security Strategy.
Because it is budget-focused, the PPBE process serves as a driver for both the JCIDS Unfortunately, JCIDS has shortcomings. First, although the cadre of trained acquisition professionals has expanded over the last ten years, the operational field force lacks the ability to define the parameters of a newly-required capability in terms that acquisition personnel can use to screen the new "need" against existing or emerging technologies. 26 Second, it takes too long to meet all of the legal and regulatory steps to generate and validate a requirement. The bureaucracy designed to ensure proper oversight of the acquisition system is partially preventing it from moving forward at a reasonable pace.
The JROC has already implemented some changes which have improved the speed of the JCIDS process. These include limiting the length of key capabilities documents required to achieve milestones, it is too soon to determine the long term effect, it has improved the ability of the council members to conduct frank discussions about difficult choices. 27 These changes have helped streamline the JCIDS process, but there is still room for improvement.
Additional suggestions follow later in this paper. The engineering and manufacturing development phase focuses on ensuring an affordable and executable manufacturing process that is operationally supportable, integrated, and interoperable. 35 The JCIDS Capability Production Document (CPD)
identifies production attributes for a single increment of a program, including Key
Performance Parameters (KPP), performance attributes, and life-cycle costs. The
Defense Acquisition Board uses the CPD to measure a contractor's delivery, and is required before a Milestone C decision. 36 When programs require changes in this phase (e.g. KPPs require modification, costs significantly exceed projections), the JROC must meet to evaluate the cause and weigh the cost, benefit, and risk associated with the program. The program cannot move forward until corrections are complete, including required testing and supporting documentation. The production and deployment phase will result in meeting the mission need through initial and full rate production, and sustainment activities. Finally, the operations and support phase overlaps with production and deployment, and ensures cost-effective sustainment along with life cycle management and disposal. At about the same time, the Army cancelled procurement of the surface-to-air missile and the non-line-of-sight launch system, and Secretary Gates pointed to these efficiencies as a way to consolidate information technology. 41 This cancellation was a result of the Army adopting a more holistic means to assess needed capabilities through a capability portfolio review (later adopted by the JROC). Instead of looking at individual systems, a portfolio review allows decision makers to evaluate capabilities across a grouping of related systems and capabilities. Doing so helps save money, prevent duplicity, and still allow for appropriate interdependency and redundant capability across the joint force. 42 These changes should produce cost savings to allow the services to modernize existing equipment and pursue more limited procurements
and represent an approach that should be continued in future acquisition decisions. 43 Why Isn't The New System Working?
There are four major reasons why the new, capability-based system is still not working well. First, despite an agreed-upon, national strategy, competition for scarce resources has exposed seams between services. In practice, the application of the capability-based approach appears to be a hybrid of the old and new ways of doing business. As a result of the switch from a threat-based to a capability-based approach, as a result of mid-stream changes to the platform. 45 The time to field key capabilities is partially a result of testing, reporting, and budget oversight requirements specified in the PPBE-JCIDS-DAS process. While these decision support processes help ensure that the government uses a deliberate process to purchase the best mix of capability, speed, and cost, the bureaucratic nature of the system is inherently time-consuming. In a time of rapidly-changing technology, it is unacceptable for a process to take a decade or more to generate a capability. The half life of technology is short enough that doing so means that by the time an item can be procured, it has undergone so many changes that the cost per unit has skyrocketed, it has become obsolete, or both. 46 Following the process is actually stifling technology acquisition instead of enabling it.
One Congressional reform that has improved the process is the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. 47 It required changes in organization and personnel, acquisition policy and process, and Congressional reporting. In formulating requirements, some positive outcomes include Combatant Commanders' input to the JROC and mandatory consideration of cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs. Non-Commissioned Officers to its acquisition force, but it will take time to mature their skills, and any assessment of their value would be premature at this time.
In the operational force, there is no cadre of trained personnel who know how to write clear and accurate capability requirements based on operational input. 48 Writing requirements is naturally tricky because it requires the ability to distill a required capability into discrete elements such as size, weight, and portability, as well as performance elements such as speed, capacity, resistance to external influences, etc.
Additionally, the process must attempt to account for near-term or mid-term future technological advances. It is very difficult to know if technology can develop fast enough to create a particular solution, and if there is a mismatch, the ensuing changes will cause delays and cost increases which could not have been foreseen. In a briefing to the U.S. Army War College last fall, Chairman Dempsey emphasized that "we must resolve our budget issues because our national defense hangs in the balance." 50 The President's budget submission to Congress that year, albeit later than the statutory requirement, requested authorization and appropriation of funding for specified capabilities. Subsequent Congressional failure to pass a budget that year (and indeed, in the past several years) coupled with entrenched disagreement between the major political parties has resulted in a series of Continuing Resolutions, stalling many procurement efforts until approval of late, omnibus or consolidated defense appropriations bills. 51 Despite administrative efforts to improve the acquisition system, the political portion of the triad has proven dysfunctional. Delays in the political process impacts the budget, and ultimately, the effectiveness and efficiency of the process as a whole.
Some Ideas to Reform The System
To minimize competition for resources, the national strategy and the plans for the joint force to support it must remain the litmus test for defense programs. Despite a desire to do what is right for the nation as a whole, senior leaders will have genuine disagreements about what ends are critical and about the best ways and means to achieve them. After agreeing that a material solution is necessary to fill an identified gap, Service Chiefs will naturally want to promote their respective strengths to ensure service dominance in a particular domain, but they must set aside parochialism in order to achieve genuinely integrated solutions. The good news is that there are an increasing number of cases in which military services are willing to share resources and become more interdependent to improve overall efficiency and effectiveness. emphasized that services must resist parochialism and cooperate more during times of fiscal constraint. 54 He said, "Air-Sea Battle is a... concept consistent with the globalized environment; it is agnostic with regard to specific regions of the world and is intended to assure access wherever our wide-ranging strategic interests are located." 55 Rather than compete for resources, he and his Navy counterpart acknowledged that they would be willing to sacrifice capacity in order to retain key capabilities, even if doing so meant becoming more interdependent. Admiral Greenert asked, "Why should I be buying this
[technology] if the Air Force is buying it? Well, maybe we should buy it together.
Maybe we should let them operate [it] , or the Army, or the Marine Corps. Where does this make sense?" 56 It has been uncommon for service chiefs to openly advocate buying less and instead planning to share resources, but doing so is simply an acknowledgement that fiscal constraints will continue, and in such an environment, cooperation on agreed upon critical capabilities best serves the national interest. To better incentivize this behavior, use of the strategic framework for investment priorities, in concert with the portfolio review concept discussed earlier, will serve to better highlight programs and capabilities that are the most critical to achieving national and 20 military strategic objectives. This should increase willingness to accept interdependence and cooperatively seek efficiencies to help ensure effectiveness while preempting overt bureaucratic or parochial behavior.
Second, the amount of time it takes to properly complete deliberate acquisition is another major hurdle. In his briefing to the Army War College, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff described the amount of time required to field new systems as "excessive and unacceptable." 57 The process is cumbersome, budget overruns are common, and if not cancelled due to excess cost, items may be approaching obsolescence by the time fielding occurs. 58 Federal Acquisition Regulations govern procurement, and the PPBE process, JCIDS, and DAS proscribe various testing, milestones, and approvals. Although designed to foster oversight and good stewardship, these confusing and bureaucratic regulations and procedures actually frustrate the process and cause costs to skyrocket.
Past changes in the acquisition system removed military scientists and specialists from much of the process, leaving "lawyers, accountants and political appointees [who] lack the judgment based on military experience" 59 to evaluate equipment suitability and performance. The extensive piecemeal design reviews and component testing did not fare well for the F-22 oxygen system. Although its parts successfully navigated the required steps, when employed with the pilot's flight vest, the oxygen system failed to operate properly. 60 The Services need to address this issue by developing and sustaining a cadre of both uniformed and civilian acquisition professionals who are suitably trained and have the requisite experience to do these types of evaluations, and then empower them to do so.
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The Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation need significant restructuring to meet 21st century needs. The "half life of technology" is about six months, 61 so a process which requires multiple years to complete will produce outdated equipment unless there are design and technology updates along the way. Unfortunately, such changes compel another series of design reviews, testing, and milestone approvals. "The process, not the product for the war fighter, has become the principal focus of the acquisition system." 62 In its 2012 report to the Secretary of Defense, The Defense Business Board pointed out that the current system prefers oversight rather than accountability, and that the interaction between PPBE, JCIDS, and DAS is still too stove-piped. The report recommended that "the entire system be 'zero-based' including all directives and regulations..." with the burden to prove a compelling need for keeping or establishing a requirement. 63 Third, the military services need a trained cadre of personnel throughout the force to accurately and thoroughly delineate a new requirement. In their examination of the defense acquisition enterprise, the Business Executives for National Security underscored the need for more and better trained personnel. Their study found that key personnel lacked the expertise to properly articulate requirements at the beginning of a program. Additionally, there is a weak link between war fighters, engineers, and financial experts throughout the process. 64 Without an accurate requirements statement, mid-stream changes become more likely. Without a strong connection between the user, the producer, and the financier, cost overruns become more likely.
And without the ability to clearly explain the time and cost effects of mid-stream changes, senior leaders cannot properly evaluate the balance of project timeliness, 22 cost, and risk. To begin to correct this, training and assignment cycles for acquisition professionals needs to be implemented earlier in the career path to allow time for mature skills prior to assumption of key positions, and field force personnel need basic training concerning how to write requirements statements.
In a move akin to including civilian advisors as part of the JROC, perhaps integrating military advisors as part of the DAB would help temper the bureaucratic, administrative reflex with operational expertise. In addition to developing a deeper bench of acquisition professionals and lay persons throughout the force, streamlining regulations and "remilitarizing" the process would help speed up procurement yet still allow for sound judgment, prudent risk-taking, and appropriate program oversight.
Finally, politics is a much more difficult problem to address. Members of Congress will likely continue to seek acceptable solutions which benefit their constituents, either through increased federal projects or by retention of programs which otherwise might be cut. This self-preserving behavior can be detrimental, but the real problem is the effect it has on authorization and appropriations processes. When legislators fail to focus on the good of the whole and become entrenched in parochial positions, very few projects receive approval or appropriated funds in a timely manner. Secretary Gates offered his support of the capability-based approach when he stated, "...not every defense program is necessary, not every defense dollar is sacred or well-spent, and more of everything is simply not sustainable." 65 The Department of Defense accounts for approximately 70 percent of all Federal procurement spending, 66 and in 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined that nearly one third of the cost growth of the Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs was due to inefficiencies. 67 The capability-based approach to support the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy is a significant improvement over the former, threat-based approach. The capability-based approach has reduced service parochialism, improved coordination among participants, and established a testing and accountability mechanism for deliberate procurements, and according to the March 2011, GAO report, newer programs are doing better than programs initiated under previous systems. 68 By improving coordination among participants and approval authorities, removing redundant portions of the process, involving military experts in the testing and evaluation of components and systems, and allowing for reasoned, prudent judgment to prevail, the process could be faster, cheaper, and still offer solutions with acceptable risk. The big question is whether the executive and legislative branches of government are willing to change the status quo. Persistent economic stress may prove to be the motivation that has been lacking.
